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Abstract
In this paper, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the optimal
path for a resource endowed economy with R&D. This path converges to
an optimal steady state, which is a saddle point, for each type of resources
(renewable or non-renewable). In this steady state, a finite size resource
sector coexists with other continuously growing sectors. In comparison,
the corresponding decentralized equilibrium is suboptimal and there is ei-
ther over- or under-investment in R&D from the social planner’s perspec-
tive. At optimum, positive long-run growth will be sustained regardless
type of resources used.
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transitional dynamics.
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1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in examining the pattern of economic growth
when there is technological change and natural resources (e.g. Grimaud and
Rouge, 2003; Lafforgue, 2008; Peretto, 2012; Peretto and Valente, 2011). This
literature focuses on the interplay between economic growth and resource ex-
ploitation. In particular, it studies how the adjustment of technological change
induced by purposive research and development (R&D) investment and natu-
ral resource stock affects economic sustainability and welfare. An important
result of this analysis is that changes in an economy’s resource endowment af-
fects growth and welfare. However, the dynamic behaviour of these models is
not well comprehended since the existing studies mostly focus on the balanced
growth path.1 In addition, a large portion of existing studies only pay attention
1Previous studies often consider natural resources, R&D, and growth separately; either
between resource abundance and economic growth (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, 1979;
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to non-renewable resources. Given the trend of shifting from non-renewable
resources which are available in fixed supply to renewable alternatives in many
countries around the world (Brown, 2000), this seems inadequate not consider-
ing the impact of the latter on an economy’s sustainable development process.
Some authors even assume that the extraction of resources is costless (e.g. Gri-
maud and Rouge, 2003). This restrictive assumption rules out the possibility of
analyzing the dynamic allocation of production factors across sectors.
Our main purpose in this paper is to analyze how the adjustment in re-
source exploitation and R&D investment changes the dynamic behaviour of the
economy. To that end, we consider a general equilibrium model of endogenous
growth with R&D and natural resources. Unlike existing studies in which only
one type of resources (renewable or non-renewable) is considered, in this paper,
both types of resources are examined. The economy under consideration con-
sists of four productive sectors that are linked to each other: a research sector,
an intermediate good sector, a final good sector, and a resource sector. Labour
is the unique production input that is required for the production of knowledge,
intermediate products and harvesting of resources. Resources (e.g. iron ore), af-
ter being extracted and processed into materials (e.g. iron), are used to produce
intermediate capital goods which then serve as inputs for the production of a
final consumption good. Vertical innovation targets at upgrading the quality of
these intermediate products. This setting makes the decision on the allocation
of labour across sectors become the most important one.
Given the above setting, we first determine the optimal path of the central-
ized economy. In doing so, we use the Euler - Lagrange equation technique to
characterize the time paths of labour allocations across sectors and the dynam-
ics of the resource stock which, in turn, help pin down the dynamics of all other
variables in the economy. Given that the social planner’s objective function is
not concave (the constraints are not convex due to the growth of technologi-
cal knowledge), we use logarithms of variables, both state and control, as tools
to transform this non-convex problem into a convex one. This transformation
allows us to prove the uniqueness of the optimal solution. Moreover, such a solu-
tion always exists, based on the Dunford-Pettis Criterion. This is an important
contribution of the paper given that the issue of the existence and uniqueness of
the solution is often neglected by the economics literature dealing with continu-
ous time. The condition of having a sufficiently productive R&D sector ensures
that positive long-run growth is sustained no matter which type of resources is
used in production. Upon attaining these results, we move on to derive a unique
steady state for each type of resources. Regardless of resource type, the steady
state is shown to be of a saddle point where the dynamic system will converge
to. Again, although the optimization problem is non-concave, we are still able
to prove that the stable manifold is locally optimal.
In the socially optimal steady state, while the resource sector maintains a
finite size, other sectors experience continuing growth. While an improvement
Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001; Lederman and Maloney, 2007) or between R&D-based
innovation and economic performance (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991;
Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
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in productivity of research always increases growth and welfare regardless of the
resource type, an improvement in that of resource production only results in the
same outcome when resources are renewable. An economy endowed with renew-
able resources generally enjoys a higher growth rate than it would be in case
of non-renewable resources. In addition, positive growth is always guaranteed
regardless the type of resources used.
When examining an equivalent decentralized version of the economy, we find
that a decentralized equilibrium path is not socially optimal. At a steady state
on that equilibrium path, looking from a social optimum viewpoint, under non-
renewable resources, the decentralized economy tends to over-invest in R&D in
the long-run if the rate of time preference is sufficiently large and under-invest
in R&D if the rate of time preference is low. By contrast, under renewable
resources, the decentralized economy always under-invests in R&D.
In comparing to the related literature, a recent paper by Suphaphiphat et
al (2015) contains a framework that is similar to the one used in our paper.
However, our paper differs from that paper in several aspects. Firstly, while
Suphaphiphat et al (2015) only pay attention to renewable resources and growth
dynamics in different regimes of access control for this resource type, our paper
studies non-renewable resources as well. By doing so, we are able to compare
the dynamic time paths of the economy under alternative forms of resources.
Secondly, in Suphaphiphat et al (2015), only the decentralized economy is pre-
sented. In our paper, the social planner’s problem is also considered and this
is the central focus of our study. Although the objective function of the social
planner is non-convex, we are able to transform it into a convex one and prove
the existence and uniqueness of the optimal time path. The analysis of the
potential over-investment/under-investment in R&D of the decentralized equi-
librium as compared to the socially optimal level is also conducted.2 Thirdly,
there is just vertical innovation in our paper instead of both types of innovation
as in their paper. This simplified assumption allows us to concentrate on the
more popular form of innovative activity whilst still able to explore how the in-
teraction between technological change and resource dynamics affects economic
performance. More importantly, it makes our model results more analytically
tractable. Lastly, we introduce the resource input into the intermediate good
production rather than the final good production. This modelling assumption is
aimed to capture the idea that intermediate products are more resource inten-
sive than the final goods.3 It also permits us to better capture the dynamics of
the economy as the intermediate good sector summons all important decisions
of the economy: demands for resources, technological change and labour.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model by describing
the basic structure of the economy. Section 3 offers equilibrium concepts for this
economy. Section 4 studies transitional dynamics, existence and uniqueness of
2The issue of under-investment/over-investment in R&D of the decentralized economy
is also investigated by Grimaud and Rouge (2003). However, the context of their paper
is different from that in our paper. In particular, they assume costless extraction of non-
renewable resources and do not study renewable resources as well as transitional dynamics.
3We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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the solution to the social planner’s problem as well as that of the optimal steady
state. In addition, the optimal steady state is shown to be saddle point stable. It
is then used as a benchmark for assessing the steady state of the corresponding
decentralized economy in Section 5. Key properties of the optimal steady state
are considered in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The economy
2.1 The final goods sector
This sector is assumed to be competitive with a large number of identical firms
producing an homogeneous consumption good Y according to the following
technology:
Yt =
1ˆ
0
Aitx
α
itdi, α ∈ (0, 1) (1)
where xit is the amount of intermediate good of vintage i (indexed on a unit
interval), and Ait is a productivity parameter attached to the latest version of
that intermediate good.
The final good is taken as a numeraire (PY = 1). The final good producers’
profit function is:
πY t = Yt −
´ 1
0
pxitxitdi
where pxit denotes the price of intermediate good i at time t. Profit maximiza-
tion gives the (inverse) demand function for each intermediate good:
pxit = αAitxα−1it , ∀i ∈ [0, 1] (2)
2.2 The intermediate goods sector
This sector is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Each intermediate
producer faces the following production technology:4
xit =
MβitL
1−β
it
Ait
, β ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ [0, 1] (3)
Here, Lit is labour employment in industry i at time t and Mit is the use of
processed natural resource materials. The appearance of Ait in the denominator
is aimed to capture the fact that products of higher degree of complexity cost
more (in terms of labour and/or resources) to produce.
Profit function for the representative monopolist i is:
πxit = pxitxit − pmtMit − wtLit
4A similar form of production function can be found in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch.9)
and Zeng (2003).
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The monopolist’s objective is to maximize this profit function subject to the
demand equation (2) and production technology equation (3). In terms of no-
tation, pmt is the unit price of processed material and wt is the cost of hiring
one unit of labour. After taking the first order conditions with respect to Mit
and Lit and then rearranging and summing over i, we obtain:
Mt =
α2βYt
pmt
(4)
Lxt =
α2(1− β)Yt
wt
(5)
where Mt =
´ 1
0
Mitdi is the aggregate stock of materials used and Lxt =
´ 1
0
Litdi
is the total labour employment employed for producing intermediate goods.
Plugging these results into equation (3) yields xit = xt = (
Mβt L
1−β
xt
Yt
)
1
1−α , ∀i.
Plugging this result into the production function in (1) gives:
Yt = A1−αt (M
β
t L
1−β
xt )
α (6)
where At =
´ 1
0
Aitdi is the economy wide aggregate stock of knowledge.5
2.3 The research sector
This sector is assumed to be competitive with free entry. There is only one
type of innovation aiming at improving the quality of existing intermediate
products (vertical innovation). Each time, when an innovation is successful, a
new (better) vintage of an intermediate product is introduced and replaces its
older version in the final good production. Assume that designs or blue prints
are protected by the patent law so that each successful innovator can charge a
monopoly price over their product until the next successful innovator occurs in
that industry.
With access to the stock of knowledge, research firms use labour to develop
new blueprints with a Poisson arrival rate λ > 0. A successful innovation lifts
up the knowledge level by a factor µ > 1. Because the prospective payoff is the
same in each industry, a same amount will be spent on vertical R&D in each
industry. If Lrt is the total amount of labour devoted to doing research then
the evolution of At can be shown as:
.
At = λ(µ− 1)LrtAt (7)
With free entry, in equilibrium, marginal cost of an extra unit of labour is
equal to its expected marginal benefit:
λVt = wt (8)
5Because the number of intermediate industries is indexed on a unit interval, At coincides
with the economy’s average technology level.
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Here, Vt is the value of a vertical innovation such that:
Vt =
∞̂
t
πxtτe
−
´ τ
t
(rs+Is)dsdτ (9)
where rs is the instantaneous interest rate at date s, Is = λLrs is the rate of
successful innovation arrival at date s, and πxtτ is the flow of operating profit at
date τ to any firm in the sector whose technology is of vintage t. In other words,
as the market for design is competitive, the value of vertical innovation is equal
to the expected present value of future operating profits to be earned by the
incumbent intermediate monopolist until being replaced by the next innovator
in the industry.
2.4 The primary or resource sector
Resources are extracted by resource firms. Following Gordon (1954) and Schae-
fer (1957), the amount of materials extracted depends on the amount of labour
input used, Lmt, and the availability of the stock of resources, Rt:
Mt = BLmtRt (10)
In this formulation, B is the productivity of resource production. The dynamics
of the stock of resources are as follows:.
Rt = f(Rt)−Mt (11)
Here, f(Rt) is the natural growth of the resources that takes the following
logistic growth form:
f(Rt) = ηRt
(
1− Rt
R
)
, η ≥ 0 (12)
where R is the carrying capacity of the environment and η represents the intrin-
sic growth rate of resources. When η > 0, the natural resources are renewable
and when η = 0, they are non-renewable. Combining (10), (11), and (12) deliv-
ers:
.
Rt = ηRt
(
1− Rt
R
)
−BLmtRt (13)
3 Equilibrium
Assume constant population and normalize the size of population to 1 (L = 1)
for simplicity. Hence, under the assumption of full employment, the labour
market equilibrium requires that:
Lxt + Lrt + Lmt = 1 (14)
And the goods market equilibrium dictates that:
Ct = Yt
6
where Yt is given by equation (6).
The program of the social planner is to maximize the utility:
U =
´∞
0
log(Yt).e−ρtdt
subject to the dynamic equations of technology and natural resources:
Ȧt
At
= λ(µ− 1)Lrt (15)
Ṙt = ηRt(1−
Rt
R̄
)−BLmtRt (16)
We define our equilibrium in this economy as follows:
Definition 1 An equilibrium of this centralized economy is an infinite sequence
of quantity allocations {Ct, Yt, At, Rt, Lxt, Lmt, Lrt}∞t=0 such that consumers’
welfare is maximized subject to intertemporal constraints facing the social plan-
ner.
Definition 2 A steady state is an equilibrium path where all variables grow
at a constant rate and the allocations of labour across the intermediate goods,
resource, and the R&D sectors are also constant.
Specifically, along such a steady state, Lxt, Lmt, Lrt are all constant;
Ct, Yt, At, Rt grow at constant rates gC , gY , gA, and gR respectively. In
this paper, we will first identify if there exists any socially optimal paths which
lead to an optimal steady state. We then analyze transitional dynamics to and
local stability around this steady state. We also contrast this optimal outcome
with an equilibrium derived for the corresponding decentralized version of the
economy. In the end, we conduct comparative statics analysis assuming the
economy is in its optimal steady state(s).
4 Characterization of optimal path(s) and local
stability of steady state(s)
4.1 Transitional dynamics of optimal path(s)
In this centralized economy, the key dynamic equations are given by those de-
scribing the evolution of technical knowledge and the dynamics of the stock of
natural resources given in (15) and (16) respectively. From these equations, we
will derive socially optimal time paths of the economy and work out conditions
for achieving the convergence to the steady state.
Let us assume that Lrt and Lmt are continuous. For any t, Lrt and Lmt be-
long to the interval [0, 1]. Any solution Rt to (16) is continuously differentiable.
Observe that when R(t) ≥ R̄, we have Ṙt < 0, ∀t. Predicting that R(t) ≤ R̄,
we can state the following:
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Lemma 1 Assume R0 < R̄. Then R(t) ≤ R̄ for all t. And, hence, log(Rt) ≥
log(R0)−Bt.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now summarize our first key results in the proposition below:
Proposition 1 To simplify notation, define ϕ = (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β) . Assume η = 0
and ρϕ +
βρ
ϕ(1−β)+Bβ < 1. Then the solution to the social planner’s maximization
problem is an optimal steady state that is uniquely defined as follows:
L̂x =
ρ
ϕ
L̂m =
βρ
ϕ(1− β) +Bβ
L̂r = 1− L̂x − L̂m
R̂t = R0e−BL̂mt
Ât = A0eλ(µ−1)(1−L̂m−L̂x)t
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition gives out the optimal steady state for the case of non-
renewable resources. The condition pointed out in proposition is required for
having an interior solution L̂r > 0. For a given set of values for ρ, α, β,B, this
condition is met if ϕ is large. This implies the necessity of having a highly
productive research sector (high value of λ and/or µ) to move the economy
forward. Under this condition, the allocations of labour, the essential production
factor, across sectors are constant and only depend on parameters characterizing
the productivities of the research sector, the resource sector, and the rate of time
preference. Upon obtaining variables on labour allocations, the constant growth
rates of technology, output, consumption, and natural resources can be derived.
Unless otherwise stated, from now and henceforth, it is assumed that η > 0.
We can now state the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let L∗xt and L
∗
mt be solutions to the social planner’s maximization
problem. Then L∗xt and L
∗
mt satisfy the following differential equations:
L̇xt
Lxt
= ϕLxt − ρ (17)
ραβ +
αβL̇mt
Lmt
+
αβηRt
R̄
− [ϕα(1− β) +Bαβ]Lmt =
α(1− β)η
LxtR̄
LmtRt (18)
where ϕ = (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β) .
Proof. See Appendix.
We have just established the equations capturing the dynamics of the two
important variables, Lxt and Lmt. These equations allow us to solve for the
time paths of Lxt and Lmt explicitly as stated in the lemma below:
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Lemma 3 The solutions to the social planner’s maximization problem, L∗xt and
L∗mt, take the following forms:
L∗xt =
1
ϕ
ρ + cxe
ρt
(19)
L∗mt =
1
e
´ t
0 b(u)du
(
c1 −
´ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx
) (20)
where
b(u) = ρ+ η
R∗u
R̄
h(x) =
ϕ(1− β)
β
+B +
η(1− β)
βL∗xt
× R
∗
x
R̄
ϕ =
(1− α)λ(µ− 1)
α(1− β)
c1 > 0, cx ≥ 0
Proof. See Appendix.
We proceed with the analysis of the two aforementioned forces, Lxt and
Lmt, that help us pin down the transition in this centralized economy. The
properties of this transition will depend on the dynamic adjustments of the
labour allocations across sectors along the transition.
Lemma 4 Let v(.) be a continuous function, then the following applies:
ˆ t
0
v(x)e−
´ x
0 v(u)dudx = 1− e−
´ t
0 v(u)du
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma is important for the characterization of the dynamic adjustments
of labour allocations. We continue to proceed with the following lemma:
Lemma 5 As soon as cx = 0, the following condition holds:
1− β
L∗xt
<
β
L∗mt
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown later, this condition is required for having an interior solution to
the maximization problem. Recall that the maximization problem for the social
planner is to solve:
max
ˆ ∞
0
L(At, Ȧt, Rt, Ṙt)e−ρtdt
where
9
L(At, Ȧt, Rt, Ṙt) = (1− α) log(At) + αβ log
[
ηRt
(
1− Rt
R̄
)
− Ṙt
]
(21)
+α(1− β) log
[
1− Ȧt
Atλ(µ− 1)
− η
B
(
1− Rt
R̄
)
+
Ṙt
BRt
]
(22)
Now let zt = log(At) and wt = log(Rt). From the above equation, one can
define that:
M(zt, żt, wt, ẇt) = (1− α)zt + αβ
[
wt + log
(
η(1− e
w
R̄
)− ẇt
)]
+ α(1− β) log
[
1− żt
λ(µ− 1) −
η
B
(1− e
wt
R̄
) +
ẇt
B
]
To simplify notations, we define the function:
G(żt, wt, ẇt) =
[
1− żt
λ(µ− 1) −
η
B
(1− e
wt
R̄
) +
ẇt
B
]
Given the above notations and settings, the following lemma is the corollary
of Lemma 5:
Lemma 6 When cx = 0, we have:
− αβ
η(1− ewt
R̄
)− ẇt
+
α(1− β)
G(żt, wt, ẇt)
× 1
B
< 0
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemmas 4, 5, 6, and their corollary are crucial for our next main results
below:
Proposition 2 Assume R0 < R̄ and ρϕ < 1 − β. Then the social planner’s
optimal solutions are
L∗xt =
ρ
ϕ
(23)
L∗mt =
1
e
´ t
0 b(u)du
(
c1 −
´ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx
) (24)
Ȧ∗t
A∗t
= λ(µ− 1)(1− L∗xt − L∗mt)
Ṙ∗t
R∗t
= η(1− R
∗
t
R̄
)−BL∗mt
R0, A0 are given and
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ϕ = (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β)
b(u) = ρ+ ηR
∗
u
R̄
h(x) = (1−α)λ(µ−1)βα +B +
η(1−β)
βL∗xt
× R
∗
x
R̄
c1 =
´∞
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, the condition ρϕ < 1 − β will be satisfied if ϕ, and hence µ and/or
λ, is large, other things equal. In other words, there should be a sufficiently
productive research sector in operation. In this case, L∗rt > 0. As R&D is
a worthwhile investment, there is an incentive to finance this activity from
household lending. The results in the proposition imply that we can establish the
transition of this economy on the values of L∗xt and L
∗
mt which jointly determine
the allocations of labour, the unique production factor in the economy, and the
rates of growth of interested variables (e.g. technology, output, resources, etc.).
Remark 1 If η = 0, then L∗mt takes the value of the steady state derived in
Proposition 1.
In the proof of Lemma 3, it is indicated that when resources are non-
renewable (η = 0), we have:
L∗mt =
1
(ϕ(1−β)β +B). 1ρ+cmeρt
where cm = c1 −
(
ϕ(1−β)
β +B
)
. 1ρ is a non-negative constant. It can be seen
that if cm > 0, Lmt approaches 0 when t → +∞. This outcome cannot be
optimal since it results in zero production of resource materials, intermediate
goods as well as final consumption goods (recall that welfare is increasing in the
amount of final consumption goods produced). Hence, it must be that cm = 0
and Lm = βρϕ(1−β)+Bβ . This leads to our next remark below.
Remark 2 When resources are non-renewable, the economy will immediately
jump to its optimal steady state derived in Proposition 1.
Interestingly, under non-renewable resources, because stock of resources can
only decrease, the optimal action for the social planner is to get the economy
immediately to its steady state. However, under renewable resources, as the
stock of resources can regenerate itself, the best option for the social planner is
to allow the economy to gradually follow its optimal path to the steady state
(which will be computed in a subsection below).
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4.2 Uniqueness and existence of the solution to the so-
cial planner’s problem
Let zt = log(At), wt = log(Rt). The maximization problem for the social plan-
ner of this economy can be written as:
max
ˆ ∞
0
N (zt, wt, Lmt, Lxt)e−ρtdt
where
N (zt, wt, Lmt, Lxt) = (1−α)zt+βα [log(B) + log(Lmt) + wt]+α(1−β) log(Lxt)
subject to the constraints
ż ≤ λ(µ− 1)(1− Lmt − Lxt) (25)
ẇt ≤ η(1−
ewt
R̄
)−BLmt (26)
Lxt + Lmt ≤ 1 (27)
Since the function N is strictly increasing, at the optimum the constraints (25),
(26) will be binding.
Proposition 3 If there exists a solution to the social planner’s maximimization
problem then that solution is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition highlights the uniqueness of the solution to the social plan-
ner’s problem. It also stimulates our probe into the existence of such a solution.
That is the content of our next proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume η > 0, R0 < R̄ and ρϕ < 1 − β. Then there exists a
solution to the social planner’s problem.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can now sum up the results obtained in Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and
Proposition 4 in the theorem below:
Theorem 1 Assume η > 0. Further assume R0 < R̄ and ρϕ < 1 − β. Then
there exists a unique solution to the social planner’s problem. This solution
satisfies the system given in Proposition 2.
4.3 Long-run properties of the optimal path: convergence
to the steady state
In this subsection, we will first identify the unique socially optimal steady state.
We will then show that the optimal path obtained in the previous subsection
will converge to this steady state.
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Proposition 5 Assume η > 0 and
2Bρ+(1−β)ϕη−√4
2B(1−β)ϕ < 1
where 4 = 4B2β2ρ2 + (1 − β)2ϕ2η2 and ϕ = (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β) then there exists a
unique socially optimal steady state that is described by
L̂x = ρϕ
L̂m =
2Bβρ+(1−β)ϕη−√4
2B(1−β)ϕ
Proof. See Appendix.
Having obtained the optimal steady state for the case of non-renewable re-
sources in Proposition 1, this proposition only presents the optimal steady state
for the case of renewable resources. The condition 2Bρ+(1−β)ϕη−
√4
2B(1−β)ϕ < 1 must be
met for having an interior solution L̂r > 0. It can be checked that the left hand
side of the condition is decreasing in ϕ, and, hence, decreasing in µ and λ, other
things equal. This means that for a given set of values of parameters α, β, η,B,
if the research sector is highly productive (for a large value of µ and/or λ) then
this condition will be satisfied. Note that the steady state values of the two
key variables depend on parameters characterizing productivity of the research
sector, the resource sector, and the rate of time preference. As shown in the
proof of the proposition in the Appendix, these steady state values are optimal.
We next prove the convergence of the above obtained optimal paths to the
optimal steady state:
Proposition 6 Assume parameters are such that the optimal steady state ex-
ists. Then the dynamic system is saddle point convergent.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result indicates that in the long-run, the dynamic system will converge
to the optimal steady state at which the highest level of welfare is obtained.
Also at this steady state, allocations of labour across sectors are constant and
key interested variables enjoy constant growth rates.
5 Optimal path versus decentralized equilibrium
path
The purpose of this Section is to characterize an equilibrium path of the decen-
tralized version of the economy and contrast it with the socially optimal path
obtained above. Such an economy is described below.
For simplicity, in this decentralized economy, there is only one consumer and
four productive sectors: final good, intermediate good, natural resources, and
innovation. The consumer consumes the final good only and uses her saving to
accumulate a financial asset in an exogenous financial market.
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Final good sector
The final good Yt is produced through a production function using an inter-
mediate good: Yt = Atxαt where At is productivity parameter attached to the
latest version of the intermediate good xt. At period t, this sector maximizes
its profit (by normalization, the price of the final good is 1 at each period), i.e.
πY t = max
x
{Atxαt − pxtxt}
This delivers pxt = αAtxα−1t .
Intermediate good sector
This sector is assumed to be monopolistic. Before conducting any production,
the intermediate good producer is assumed to borrow an amount of money from
households to finance research activity (i.e. through paying researchers a labour
income wage) which aims to improve the quality of the intermediate product.
Once the research is successful, the intermediate good producer acquires the
patent and starts producing an amount of output xt from using a quantity Mt of
resource materials and an amount Lxt of labour. More precisely, at time t, xt =
Mβt L
1−β
xt
At
where β ∈ (0, 1). The appearance of At in the denominator is aimed
to capture the fact that products of a higher degree of complexity cost more to
produce. This sector maximizes its profit: πxt = max{pxtxt − pmtMt −wtLxt}.
This maximization problem yields:
pmt = α2βA1−αt M
αβ−1
t L
α(1−β)
xt
wt = α2(1− β)A1−αt Mαβt Lα(1−β)−1xt
The net profit goes to the intermediate good producer will be π̂xt = πxt − rtat
that is the profit after making the interest payment to the households.
Research sector
This sector contains only researchers who conduct research in return for a wage
income. The total wage income is wtLrt. There is no profit accrued to this
sector.
Natural sesource sector
Resources are freely accessible. Resource firms use only labor to extract the
natural resources according to the production function Mt = BRtLmt where Rt
is the stock of resources satisfying the following constraints:
Rt ≥ 0
Ṙt ≤ ηRt(1−
Rt
R̄
)−Mt
Firms in this sector maximize profit πmt = max{pmtBRtLmt − wtLmt} under
these resources constraints.
Consumer
The consumer maximizes her lifetime utility
´∞
0
log(ct)e−ρtdt under the in-
tertemporal budget constraints:
ct + ȧt = rtat + (πY t + π̂xt + πmt) + wt(Lxt + Lmt + Lrt)
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where at denotes the financial asset (e.g. bond) accumulated (in an exogenous
market) by the consumer and rt is an exogenous interest rate. This maximiza-
tion problem yields the Euler equation for the growth of consumption:
ċt = (rt − ρ)ct
Equilibrium
At equilibrium we have:
ct = Yt
Lxt + Lmt + Lrt = 1
In addition, we have πY t = (1 − α)Yt; π̂xt = πxt − rtat = α(1 − α)Yt − rtat;
πmt = α2βYt − wtLmt and wtLxt = α2(1− β)Yt.
Define (Y ∗t , c
∗
t , a
∗
t , x
∗
t ,M
∗
t , R
∗
t , A
∗
t , L
∗
xt, L
∗
mt , L
∗
rt)t as the sequence of equilib-
rium allocations and (p∗xt, p
∗
mt, w
∗
t )t as the associated sequence of prices and
wage. Along this equilibrium path, we have:
Lemma 7 For any t, πmt = max{p∗mtBR∗tLm − w∗tLm} = 0. If L∗mt > 0 then
w∗t = BR
∗
t p
∗
mt.
Proof. Along an equilibrium path, the resource sector maximizes the profit
πmt = maxLm≥0{p∗mtBR∗tLm − w∗tLm}. Hence, the profit is zero. If L∗mt > 0
then w∗t = BR
∗
t p
∗
mt.
We state the following propositions:
Proposition 7 In this decentralized economy, at equilibrium, we have:
ċ∗t = (rt − ρ)c∗t
Y ∗t = A
∗
tx
∗α−1
t (28)
x∗t =
M∗βt L
∗1−β
xt
A∗t
(29)
c∗t = Y
∗
t
ȧ∗t = r
∗
t a
∗
t + w
∗
tL
∗
rt
M∗t = BL
∗
mtR
∗
t (30)
L∗xt =
α2(1− β)Y ∗t
w∗t
(31)
p∗xt = αA
∗
tx
∗α−1
t
p∗mt = α
2βA∗1−αt M
∗αβ−1
t L
∗α(1−β)
xt (32)
p∗mtBR
∗
t = w
∗
t (33)
Ṙ∗t = ηR
∗
t
(
1− R
∗
t
R
)
−BL∗mtR∗t (34)
Ȧ∗t = A
∗
tλ(µ− 1)L∗rt (35)
L∗xt + L
∗
mt + L
∗
rt = 1 (36)
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Proof. It can be seen that these results are rather straightforward from the
discussion at the beginning of the section.
Proposition 8 An equilibrium of this decentralized economy does not solve the
social planner’s problem.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results indicate that a decentralized equilibrium is not optimal from a
social planner’s point of view. Given that technological progress is the main
engine of growth in this economy, this leads us to the question of comparing
the rates of growth of technology in the two steady states: on the optimal path
versus on the decentralized equilibrium path. We can summarize the results in
the proposition below:
Proposition 9 Denote ρ̃ = ϕ[ϕ(1−β)+Bβ]ϕ+Bβ . If η = 0, over the long-run, the
decentralized economy tends to under-invest in R&D if ρ → 0 and over-invest
in R&D if ρ→ ρ̃. If η > 0, over the long-run, the decentralized economy always
under-invests in R&D.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result deserves some discussion. When the economy is endowed with
non-renewable resources, the rate of time preference, ρ, plays an important
role in determining how much long-run investment in R&D (in a decentralized
steady state) deviates from its socially desirable level. If ρ is small, the cost of
the trade-off between current consumption and future consumption is small so
there is more incentive for households to lend money (for conducting R&D in
the first place). In addition, the social planner is very patient: he prefers slower
extraction of resources. As a result, the social planner directs more labour to
work in the research sector than what households would do. By contrast, if ρ
is large, knowing that the cost of borrowing money to finance research activity
is high (because households value current consumption more highly), the social
planner may want to direct labour away from the research sector. This act may
result in an over-investment in R&D of the decentralized economy.
However, in case of renewable resources, given that the economy will always
extract an amount of resources that is equal to the total natural regeneration of
that stock, a change in ρ will not affect the resource firms’ extracting strategy.
Because the social planner knows technological change is a positive externality
(due to knowledge spillovers), he wants to internalize this externality by direct-
ing more labour to research activity. This means that the decentralized economy
will exert a smaller effort in R&D than what the social planner desires to have.
6 Properties of the socially optimal steady state:
a comparative statics study
Having known that the centralized economy will converge to the socially optimal
steady state in the long-run, it will be interesting to discuss the properties of this
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steady state. In other words, we can do the comparative statics at this long-run
equilibrium and analyze possible impacts on output growth and welfare. This
section is devoted to that task.
Proposition 10 Other things equal, along the steady state for each type of
resources, output growth and welfare are increasing in parameters characterizing
productivity of the R&D sector (λ and µ) but decreasing in the rate of time
preference (ρ).
Proof. See Appendix.
The results are quite intuitive. When λ or µ increases, it becomes more
socially efficient to invest in the R&D sector (relatively to other sectors) so
the social planner will choose a higher level of L̂r which then enhances growth
of technological knowledge and output. An increase in ρ means households
value current consumption relatively more than future consumption. In order
to produce more output to meet higher consumption demand today, the social
planner will direct more labour to work in the resource sector (L̂m increases)
and the intermediate goods sector (L̂x increases). As a result, there will be a
fall in L̂r meaning lower growth of technology and output. Consumption growth
will also be lower because consumers increase current consumption relatively to
future consumption.
Because an increase in either λ or µ raises output and consumption so welfare
rises. However, an increase in ρ reduces welfare as it makes the whole path of
utility fall below the one before the shock.
Proposition 11 Other things equal, along the steady state, an improvement in
the productivity of the resource sector (an increase in B):
• increases both welfare and output growth if resources are renewable.
• increases welfare but has no impact on output growth if resources are non-
renewable.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results can be explained as follows. An increase in B makes it more
productive to extract natural resources. Equivalently, less labour is needed for
producing resource material to meet the existing market demand. Hence, the
social planner will allocate less labour to the resource sector (L̂m decreases)
and more into the R&D activities (L̂r increases).6 This change will increase
welfare as there is more output and consumption created. It will also increase
output growth for the case of renewable resources because the growth rate of
technology is higher. However, it does not affect output growth under non-
renewable resources. The reason is that an increase in B, on the one hand,
increases L̂r and, hence, technological change, will also exhaust resources at a
6Another way of looking at this is that as the social planner always knows the optimal
level of natural resources to be R = R̄(1− BLm
η
), he will reduce Lm in accordance with the
amount of increase in B.
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faster rate on the other (the fall in L̂m is less than the increase in B). These
two opposing effects cancel out each other at the optimum.
Proposition 12 Assume parameters are such that there exists a steady state
for each type of resources then output growth is generally higher under renewable
resources than under non-renewable resources. In addition, positive growth is
always guaranteed regardless what type of resources is used.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this economy, output growth comes from two different sources: the evo-
lution of technological knowledge and the natural resource dynamics. Because
natural resources cannot grow without bound, the best trajectory that the so-
cial planner can choose is to reach the optimal level of resources at which the
rate of resource extraction is equal to the rate of natural growth. However, this
policy is only achievable in case of renewable resources. With non-renewable
resources, the rate of resource extraction always soften the rate of growth of out-
put as output needs to increase to make up for the amount of natural resources
that has been depleted. Given that technological progress is the key driver of
the economy, it in turns requires the evolution of technological knowledge be
strong enough to lift the economy up out of the stagnation trap.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced a resource sector into an endogenous growth model
with R&D investment. We have shown how the dynamic equilibrium could
be represented by a dynamic system characterized by the sectoral allocation
of labour, the evolution of technology and the dynamics of the resource stock.
We show that under plausible assumptions, the social planner can achieve a
stable transitional dynamics to a unique socially optimal steady state. In this
steady state, the stock of resources remains in finite size while other sectors
carry continuous growth.
Comparing to this optimal path, in the long-run, the equivalent decentralized
economy always under-invests in R&D in case of renewable resources. Mean-
while, it tends to over-invest in R&D if the rate of time preference is large and
under-invest in R&D if the rate of time preference is low in case of non-renewable
resources.
The socially optimal steady state has the following features. Equilibrium
growth rate in an economy endowed with renewable resources is higher than
it would be in the case of non-renewable resources. As soon as the research
sector is highly productive, positive growth is always sustained regardless type
of resources used.
We have also examined the long-run reaction of the economy to a number of
changes regarding innovative production capacity, rate of time preference, and
resource sector productivity. While an improvement in productivity of the R&D
is always growth and welfare enhancing, that of the resource sector is subject
to the type of resources that is considered.
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Results of this paper convey several important messages to policy makers. If
there is an option between alternative resources, a decision maker may wish to
use more of renewable resources in production as that policy is growth enhanc-
ing. He may also channel more investment towards enhancing R&D efficiency
in order to achieve higher permanent positive growth. Given that the decentral-
ized economy equilibrum is suboptimal, this raises the question of designing an
appropriate R&D tax/subsidy policy that helps make this equilibrium optimal.
Investing this issue would be an interesting direction for future research. An-
other future research avenue would be to examine the extent to which empirical
evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions set out in the paper.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We will prove this lemma by method of contradiction. To that end, assume there
exists t0 such that R(t0) > R̄. For any ε > 0 which satisfies R̄ + ε < R(t0),
there exists t ∈ (0, t0) such that R(t) = R̄+ ε. Now define:
Iε =
{
t ∈ [0, t0] : R(t) = R̄+ ε
}
Since Rt is continuous, the set Iε is compact. Let t1 = max{t : t ∈ Iε} then
t1 < t0. Evaluating the dynamics of resources at time t1, we have:
(
Ṙ(t)
R(t)
)
t1
= −ηε
R̄
−BLm < 0
Hence, for t′ ∈ (t1, t0) that is close enough to t1, we have R(t′) < R(t1) =
R̄+ ε < R(t0). In this case, there must be t2 ∈ (t′, t0) such that R(t2) = R̄+ ε.
This implies t2 ∈ Iε and t2 ≤ t1 < t′ which is a contradiction. Therefore,
R(t) ≤ R̄ for any t.
From equation (16), we have:
dlogR
dt
≥ −BLmt ≥ −B
since Lmt ≤ 1. By integrating this inequality we get log(Rt) ≥ log(R0)−Bt.
Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove this proposition in two parts. In the first part, we prove that
there exists a unique steady state that solves the social planner’s maximization
problem. In the second part, we show that this steady state is optimal.
Using (6) and (10), the utility function can be rewritten as:
U =
´∞
0
log(A1−αt BαβL
αβ
mtR
αβ
t L
α(1−β)
xt ).e−ρtdt
On the steady state, we now have Rt = R0e−tBLm where R0 is the initial stock
of natural resources. With a note that
´∞
0
te−ρtdt = 1ρ2 and
´∞
0
e−ρtdt = 1ρ ,
the utility function on the stedy state is:
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ρU = (1− α) log(A0) + αβ log(B) + αβ log(Lm) + αβ log(R0)
+ α(1− β) log(Lx)−
αβBLm
ρ
+
(1− α)λ(µ− 1)(1− Lx − Lm)
ρ
Lx and Lm will be chosen to maximize this utility functions. The first order
conditions give:
L̂x =
αρ(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)(1− α) =
ρ
ϕ
(37)
L̂m =
αβρ
λ(µ− 1)(1− α) +Bαβ =
βρ
ϕ(1− β) +Bβ (38)
where ϕ = (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β) . Clearly, L̂x > 0 and L̂m > 0. Hence, the value of L̂r is:
L̂r = 1−
[
ρ
ϕ
+
βρ
ϕ(1− β) +Bβ
]
(39)
When L̂r > 0 or ρϕ +
βρ
ϕ(1−β)+Bβ < 1 we automatically have 0 < L̂x, L̂m, L̂r < 1.
With these obtained results, we can calculate the growth rates of technology and
natural resources along the steady state as follows:
R̂t = R0e−BL̂mt
Ât = A0eλ(µ−1)(1−L̂m−L̂x)t
To prove that this solution is optimal, we compute the following:
4U =
limT→∞
[´ T
0
log
(
Â1−αt B
αβL̂αβmtR̂
αβ
t L̂
α(1−β)
xt
)
.e−ρtdt−
´ T
0
log
(
A1−αt B
αβLαβmtR
αβ
t L
α(1−β)
xt
)
.e−ρtdt
]
Using integration by parts we have:
´ T
0
log
(
Â1−αt
)
.e−ρtdt =
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
Â1−αt
)]T
0
+
´ T
0
1
ρe
−ρt(1− α) ˙̂ tA
Ât
dt
´ T
0
log
(
R̂αβt
)
.e−ρtdt =
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
R̂αβt
)]T
0
+
´ T
0
1
ρe
−ρtαβ
˙̂
tR
R̂t
dt
´ T
0
log
(
A1−αt
)
.e−ρtdt =
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
A1−αt
)]T
0
+
´ T
0
1
ρe
−ρt(1− α) ȦtAt dt
´ T
0
log
(
Rαβt
)
.e−ρtdt =
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
Rαβt
)]T
0
+
´ T
0
1
ρe
−ρtαβ ṘtRt dt
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In addition, applying the inequality x ≥ log(1 + x) we have:
log(LmtLmt ) = log(1 +
Lmt−L̂mt
L̂mt
) ≤ Lmt−L̂mt
L̂mt
Hence
−αβ log(Lmt
L̂mt
) ≥ −αβ.Lmt−L̂mt
L̂mt
or
αβ
[
log(L̂mt)− log(Lmt)
]
≥ αβ. L̂mt−Lmt
L̂mt
Similarly, the following holds:
α(1− β)
[
log(L̂xt)− log(Lxt)
]
≥ α(1− β). L̂xt−Lxt
L̂xt
Inserting these results into the equation for 4U and observing that:
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
Â1−αt
)]+∞
0
=
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
A1−αt
)]+∞
0
= 1ρ log
(
A1−α0
)
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
R̂αβt
)]T
0
=
[
− 1ρe−ρt log
(
Rαβt
)]T
0
= 1ρ log
(
Rαβ0
)
we get:
4U ≥
´ +∞
0
1
ρe
−ρt(1−α) ˙̂ tA
Ât
dt+
´ +∞
0
1
ρe
−ρtαβ
˙̂
tR
R̂t
dt+
´ +∞
0
e−ρtαβ. L̂mt−Lmt
L̂mt
dt+´ +∞
0
e−ρtα(1− β). L̂xt−Lxt
L̂xt
dt−
´ +∞
0
1
ρe
−ρt(1− α) ȦtAt dt−
´ +∞
0
1
ρe
−ρtαβ ṘtRt dt
Using (37) and (38) then:
αβ. L̂mt−Lmt
L̂mt
= λ(µ−1)(1−α)+Bαβρ .(L̂mt − Lmt)
α(1− β). L̂xt−Lxt
L̂xt
= λ(µ−1)(1−α)+Bαβρ .(L̂xt − Lxt)
Plugging these results in, we can figure out that 4U ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
The maximization problem for the social planner of this economy is to solve:
max
ˆ ∞
0
L(At, Ȧt, Rt, Ṙt)e−ρtdt
where
L(At, Ȧt, Rt, Ṙt) = (1− α) log(At) + αβ log
[
ηRt
(
1− Rt
R̄
)
− Ṙt
]
(40)
+α(1− β) log
[
1− Ȧt
Atλ(µ− 1)
− η
B
(
1− Rt
R̄
)
+
Ṙt
BRt
]
(41)
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Considering interior solutions, we have the following Euler-Lagrange equations:
d
dt
[
∂L
∂Ȧt
e−ρt
]
=
∂L
∂At
e−ρt (42)
d
dt
[
∂L
∂Ṙt
e−ρt
]
=
∂L
∂Rt
e−ρt (43)
The LHS of (42) is given by:
ρe−ρt
α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
1
AtLxt
+
e−ρt
AtLxt
α(1− β)
[
Lrt +
L̇xt
λ(µ− 1)Lxt
]
while its RHS is equal to:
e−ρt
1− α
At
+
α(1− β)
Lxt
Lrt
At
e−ρt
Equating the LHS with the RHS gives:
ρ
α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
1
Lxt
+
1
Lxt
α(1− β) L̇xt
λ(µ− 1)Lxt
= 1− α
or
ρα(1− β) + α(1− β) L̇xt
Lx
= (1− α)λ(µ− 1)Lxt
Further simplifying leads to:
ρ+
L̇xt
Lxt
=
(1− α)λ(µ− 1)
α(1− β) Lxt
Using the notation that is previously defined (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β) = ϕ then:
L̇xt
Lxt
= ϕLxt − ρ
Similarly, the LHS of (43) is:
−ρe−ρt
[
− αβ
BRtLmt
+
α(1− β)
BRtLxt
]
+ e−ρt
[
αβ
B
(
L̇mt
RtL2mt
+
1
LmtR2t
Ṙt
)
− α(1− β)L̇xt
BRtL2xt
− α(1− β)
BR2tLxt
Ṙt
]
and its RHS is:
e−ρt
[
αβ
BLmtRt
η
(
1− 2Rt
R̄
)
+
α(1− β)
Lxt
(
η
BR̄
− Ṙt
BR2t
)]
Now equating LHS with RHS noting (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β) = ϕ to get:
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ραβ + αβL̇mtLmt +
αβηRt
R̄
− [ϕα(1− β) +Bαβ]Lmt = α(1−β)ηLxtR̄ LmtRt
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider equation (17), we write Υ = 1Lxt to obtain Υ̇ = ρΥ− ϕ. After sloving
this simplified differential equation we get:
L∗xt =
1
ϕ
ρ+cxe
ρt
where cx is a constant such that cx ≥ 0.
To get the functional form of L∗mt we transform equation (18) to obtain:
˙Lmt +
(
ρ+ ηRt
R̄
)
Lmt =
(
ϕ(1−β)
β +B +
η(1−β)Rt
βR̄Lxt
)
L2mt
To simplify notations, define b(t) = ρ+ ηRt
R̄
and h(t) = ϕ(1−β)β +B +
η(1−β)Rt
βR̄Lxt
.
The above equation now becomes:
˙Lmt + b(t)Lmt = h(t)L2mt
Let zt = 1Lmt (noting that Lmt 6= 0) then żt = −
˙Lmt
L2mt
. This is equivalent to
˙Lmt = −żtL2mt. Substituting results into the above equation and simplifying
gives:
żt − b(t)zt = −h(t)
The homogeneous equation takes the form:
żt − b(t)zt = 0
This equation yields the homogeneous solution as (noting that zt 6= 0)
zh = c1e
´ t
0 b(u)du
Returning to the original non-homogeneous equation given above (h(t) 6= 0),
assume that a particular solution exists and takes the following form:
zp = v(t).e
´ t
0 b(u)du
where v(t) will need to be determined. Substituting this into the LHS of the
non-homogeneous equation yields:
żp−b(t)zp = v′(t)ee
´ t
0 b(u)du +v(t)e
´ t
0 b(u)dub(t)−b(t)v(t)e
´ t
0 b(u)du = v′(t)e
´ t
0 b(u)du
The function v(t) must be chosen so that:
v′(t)e
´ t
0 b(u)du = −h(t)
or equivalently
v′(t) = −h(t)
e
´ t
0 b(u)du
Upon taking integral we get:
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v(t) = −
´ t
0
h(x)
e
´x
0 b(u)du
dx+ c2
For simplicity, set c2 = 0 then zp = −e
´ t
0 b(u)du
´ t
0
h(x)
e
´x
0 b(u)du
dx = −e
´ t
0 b(t)dt
´ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx.
The general solution to the non-homegeneous equation will be:
zt = zh + zp = c1e
´ t
0 b(u)du − e
´ t
0 b(u)du
´ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx
Thus,
L∗mt =
1
e
´ t
0 b(u)du(c1−
´ t
0 h(x)e
−
´x
0 b(u)dudx)
where c1 > 0 is a constant. It can be shown that in the special case when η = 0,
we have:
L∗mt =
1
(ϕ(1−β)β +B). 1ρ+cmeρt
where cm = c1 −
(
ϕ(1−β)
β +B
)
. 1ρ is a non-negative constant.
Proof of Lemma 4
We have:
v(x)e−
´ x
0 v(u)du = − d
dx
(
e−
´ x
0 v(u)du
)
Hence, it follows that:
ˆ t
0
v(x)e−
´ x
0 v(u)dudx = −
[
e−
´ x
0 v(u)du
]x=t
x=0
= 1− e−
´ t
0 v(u)du
Proof of Lemma 5
Let cx = 0. First, since L∗mt > 0, ∀t we must have c1 ≥
´∞
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx.
Let 4 = 1−βL∗xt −
β
L∗mt
, we have 1−βL∗xt = (1− β)
ϕ
ρ . Tedious computations lead to:
h(t)e−
´ t
0 b(u)du =
[
ϕ(1− β)
β
+B +
η(1− β)ϕR(t)
βρR̄
]
e−ρt−
´ t
0
ηR(x)
R̄
dx
Using Lemma 4 we obtain:
ˆ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx = B
ˆ t
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
(
1− e−
´ t
0 b(u)du
)
so that
β
L∗mt
=
βc1e
´ t
0 b(u)du − βBe
´ t
0 b(u)du
ˆ t
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx− ϕ(1− β)
ρ
e
´ t
0 b(u)du +
ϕ(1− β)
ρ
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Therefore
4 = −βc1e
´ t
0 b(u)du + βBe
´ t
0 b(u)du
ˆ t
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρ
e
´ t
0 b(u)du
= −βe
´ t
0 b(u)du
(
c1 −B
ˆ t
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx− ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
)
Since
c1 ≥
ˆ ∞
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx
= B
ˆ ∞
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
[
1− e−
´ t
0 b(u)du
]∞
0
we get
c1 −B
ˆ t
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx− ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
≥ B
ˆ ∞
t
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx− ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
e−
´∞
0 b(u)du
≥ B
ˆ ∞
t
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx > 0
since e−
´∞
0 b(u)du = 0. Thus, 4 < 0.
Proof of Lemma 6
We have η(1− ewt
R̄
)− ẇt = BLmt and G(żt, wt, ẇt) = Lxt. Hence
− αβ
η(1− ewt
R̄
)− ẇt
+
α(1− β)
G(żt, wt, ẇt)
× 1
B
=
−αβ
BLmt
+
α(1− β)
BLxt
=
α
B
(
1− β
Lxt
− β
Lmt
)
< 0
where the result obtained in the second line comes from Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part of the proof for this proposition has been done in Lemma 3. Here we
only need to show that the solutions to the system of differential equations of
Proposition 2 are optimal. We have:
c1 = B
ˆ ∞
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
[
1− e−
´∞
0 b(u)du
]
= B
ˆ ∞
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
since e−
´∞
0 b(u)du = 0. Hence, it follows that
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c1 −
ˆ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx = c1 −B
ˆ t
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx− ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
e−
´ t
0 b(u)du
= B
ˆ ∞
t
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
e−
´ t
0 b(u)du
Therefore
L∗mt =
1
Be
´ t
0 b(u)du
´∞
t
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+ ϕ(1−β)ρβ
Obviously, L∗mt ≤ ρβϕ(1−β) . Now observe that
e
´ t
0 b(u)du
ˆ ∞
t
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx =
ˆ ∞
t
e−
´ x
t
b(u)dudx
≤
ˆ ∞
t
e−ρ(x−t)dx =
1
ρ
Thus, L∗mt ≥ 1B
ρ +
ϕ(1−β)
ρβ
= ρβBβ+ϕ(1−β) . Since L
∗
xt + L
∗
mt < 1, we need to impose
that:
ρ
ϕ
+
ρβ
ϕ(1− β) < 1
or equivalently
ρ
ϕ
< 1− β
Again, let zt = log(At) and wt = log(Rt)
M(z, ż, w, ẇ) = (1− α)z + αβ
[
w + log
(
η(1− e
w
R̄
)
)
− ẇ
]
(44)
+ α(1− β) log(1− ż
λ(µ− 1) −
η
B
(1− e
w
R̄
) +
ẇ
B
) (45)
The maximization problem is to solve:
max
ˆ ∞
0
M(zt, żt, wt, ẇt)e−ρtdt
Considering interior solutions, we have the following Euler-Lagrange equations:
d
dt
[
∂M
∂żt
e−ρt
]
=
∂M
∂zt
e−ρt (46)
d
dt
[
∂M
∂ẇt
e−ρt
]
=
∂M
∂wt
e−ρt (47)
Let
G(ż, w, ẇ) =
(
1− ż
λ(µ− 1) −
η
B
(1− e
w
R̄
) +
ẇ
B
)
26
One can check that (46) can be written as
d
dt
(
−α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1) ×
1
G(ż, w, ẇ)
e−ρt
)
= (1− α)e−ρt (48)
while (47) can be written as:
d
dt
[(
− αβ
η(1− ew
R̄
)− ẇ +
α(1− β)
G(ż, w, ẇ)
× 1
B
)
e−ρt
]
(49)
=
(
αβ − αβ
η(1− ew
R̄
)− ẇ ×
η
R̄
ew +
α(1− β)
G(ż, w, ẇ)
× η
R̄B
ew
)
e−ρt (50)
We will show that
lim
T→+∞
ˆ ∞
0
[M(z∗, ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)−M(z, ż, w, ẇ)] e−ρtdt ≥ 0
where zt = log(A
∗
t ), wt = log(R
∗
t ), zt = log(At), wt = log(Rt). The variables
A∗t , R
∗
t are given in the statement of Proposition (2). The variables At, Rt
satisfy the dynamic equations (15) and (16).
We have
M(z∗, ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)−M(z, ż, w, ẇ) ≥
(1−α)(z∗t − zt) +αβ(w∗t −wt) +
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
[
− η
R̄
(ew
∗ − ew)− (ẇ∗ − ẇ)
]
+
α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
[
− 1
λ(µ− 1)(ż
∗ − ż) + η
BR̄
(ew
∗ − ew) + ẇ
∗ − ẇ
B
]
− αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
(ẇ∗t−ẇt)
= (1−α)(z∗t−zt)+αβ(w∗t−wt)+
(
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
)
η
R̄
(−ew∗+ew)
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
× 1
λ(µ− 1)(ż
∗−ż)+ α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
(ẇ∗−ẇ)− αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
(ẇ∗t−ẇt)
On the one hand, we have:
−ew∗ + ew ≥ −ew∗(w∗ − w)
On the other hand, from Lemma 6, we have:
(
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
)
> 0
Hence (
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
)
× η
R̄
(−ew∗ + ew)
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> −
(
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
)
× η
R̄
ew
∗
(w∗ − w)
and
M(z∗, ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)−M(z, ż, w, ẇ) ≥
[
(1− α)(z∗t − zt)−
α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
1
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
(ż∗ − ż)
]
+αβ(w∗t−wt)−
(
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
)
× η
R̄
ew
∗
(w∗−w)+ α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
(ẇ∗−ẇ)
− αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
(ẇ∗t − ẇt)
Let
4T =
ˆ T
0
[M(z∗, ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)−M(z, ż, w, ẇ)] e−ρtdt ≥ IT + JT
where
IT =
ˆ T
0
[
(1− α)(z∗t − zt)−
α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
1
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
(ż∗ − ż)
]
e−ρtdt
JT =
ˆ T
0
[
αβ(w∗t − wt)−
(
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
)
× η
R̄
ew
∗
(w∗ − w)
]
e−ρtdt
+
ˆ T
0
α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
(ẇ∗ − ẇ)e−ρtdt−
ˆ T
0
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
(ẇ∗t − ẇt)e−ρtdt
Computing IT , we get:
IT =
ˆ T
0
[
(1− α)e−ρt + α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
d
dt
(
1
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
e−ρt
)]
(z∗t − zt)dt
−α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
[
1
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
(z∗t − zt)e−ρt
]T
0
Using (48), we have:
IT = −
α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
[
1
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
(z∗t − zt)e−ρt
]T
0
= −α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
z∗T − zT
G(ż∗T , w
∗
T , ẇ
∗
T )
e−ρT
since z∗0 = z0 = log(A0) and G(ż
∗
0 , w
∗
0 , ẇ
∗
0) = L
∗
x0 =
ρ
ϕ . Observe that we have:
G(ż∗T , w
∗
T , ẇ
∗
T ) = L
∗
xT =
ρ
ϕ
log(A0) ≤ z∗T ≤ log(A0) + λ(µ− 1)T
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and
log(A0) ≤ zT ≤ log(A0) + λ(µ− 1)T
Therefore, we obtain:
lim
T→+∞
IT = 0
Now consider JT . We have:
JT =
ˆ T
0
αβ(w∗t−wt)e−ρtdt+
α(1− β)
B
{[
(w∗t − wt)e−ρt
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
]T
0
−
ˆ T
0
(w∗t − wt)
d
dt
(
e−ρt
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
)
dt
}
−
ˆ T
0
(
αβ
η(1− ew∗
R̄
)− ẇ∗
− α(1− β)
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)B
)
× η
R̄
ew
∗
(w∗ − w)
−
[
αβ
η(1− ew
∗
R̄
)−ẇ∗
(w∗t − wt)e−ρt
]T
0
+
´ T
0
αβ(w∗t − wt) ddt
(
e−ρt
η(1− ew
∗
R̄
)−ẇ∗
)
dt
Now using (50), and observing that G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗) = L∗x, η(1− e
w∗
R̄
)−ẇ∗ = BL∗m,
and w = w0 we get
JT =
[
α(1− β)
BL∗x
− αβ
BL∗m
]
(w∗T − wT )e−ρT
We have:
logR0 − bT ≤ logR∗T = w∗T ≤ log R̄
logR0 − bT ≤ logRT = wT ≤ log R̄
which implies
(logR0 − bT )e−ρT ≤ w∗T e−ρT ≤ log R̄e−ρT
(logR0 − bT )e−ρT ≤ wT e−ρT ≤ log R̄e−ρT
Hence, we can induce that:
lim
T→∞
w∗T e
−ρT = lim
T→∞
wT e
−ρT = 0
These imply:
lim
T→+∞
JT = 0
And finally, we obtain:
lim
T→+∞
4T ≥ 0
That is the end of the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
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Observe that N is concave and the constraints (25), (26), (27) are convex.
Assume that (zt, wt, Lmt, Lxt), (z′t, w
′
t, L
′
mt, L
′
xt) are two solutions with z0 =
z′0, w0 = w
′
0. We have
żt = λ(µ− 1)(1− Lmt − Lxt)
ż′t = λ(µ− 1)(1− L′mt − L′xt)
ẇt = η(1−
ewt
R̄
)−BLmt
ẇ′t = η(1−
ewt
R̄
)−BLmt
and
ν =
ˆ ∞
0
N (zt, wt, Lmt, Lxt)e−ρtdt =
ˆ ∞
0
N (z′t, w′t, L′mt, L′xt)e−ρtdt
Since log(Lmt), log(Lxt) are strictly concave we must have Lmt = L′mt, Lxt = L
′
xt
and, hence, żt = ż′t, ẇt = ẇ
′
t. Since z0 = z
′
0, w0 = w
′
0 we obtain zt = z
′
t, wt = w
′
t.
Proof of Proposition 4
We have ż = λ(µ − 1)Lr ≥ 0. Hence z(t) ≥ z0 = log(A0). We also have
0 ≤ ż ≤ λ(µ− 1) which implies z(t) ≤ z0 + λ(µ− 1) and hence
|z(t)| ≤ |z0|+ λ(µ− 1)t (51)
Thus
ˆ +∞
0
|z(t)|e−ρtdt ≤
ˆ +∞
0
(|z0|+ λ(µ− 1)t) e−ρtdt ≡ µ1 (52)
and
ˆ +∞
0
|ż(t)|e−ρtdt ≤
ˆ +∞
0
λ(µ− 1)e−ρtdt ≡ µ2 (53)
Since R0 < R̄ we have −B ≤ ẇ ≤ η. Hence
|ẇ| ≤ B + η (54)
w0 −Bt ≤ wt ≤ w0 + ηt
This implies
ˆ ∞
0
|w(t)|e−ρtdt ≤
ˆ ∞
0
[|w0|+ (η +B)t] e−ρtdt ≡ µ3 (55)
ˆ ∞
0
|ẇ(t)|e−ρtdt ≤ (B + η)
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtdt ≡ µ4 (56)
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It is obvious that
ˆ ∞
0
Lme
−ρtdt ≤ 1
ρ
≡ µ5, (57)
ˆ ∞
0
Lxe
−ρtdt ≤ 1
ρ
≡ µ5 (58)
The Criterion
´∞
0
N (z, w, Lm, Lx)e−ρtdt is concave in (z, w, Lm, Lx) and is
bounded above by a constant, which is equal to 1ρ×[(1− α)µ1 + αβµ3 + αβ| log(B)|],
when (z, w, Lm, Lx) satisfy (25), (26), and (27). Denote ν as its supremum.
Now define (zn, wn, Lnm, L
n
x)n as a sequence such that limn→+∞
´∞
0
N (zn, wn, Lnm, Lnx) =
ν. From (51)-(58) and since Lm ∈ [0, 1], Lx ∈ [0, 1], by using Dunford-Pettis Cri-
terion (Dunford and Schwartz, 1966) one obtains that the sequence (zn, wn, żn, ẇn, Lnm, L
n
x)n
is in a relatively compact set for the weak topology σ(L1(e−ρtdt), L∞). Hence,
it weakly converges to (z∗, w∗, φ∗, ψ∗, L∗m, L
∗
x). Using the same argument as in
d’Albis et al (2008), we obtain that φ∗ = ż∗, ψ∗ = ẇ∗. Since weak convergence
implies pointwise convergence we have:
ż∗ = λ(µ− 1)(1− l∗m − L∗x)
ẇ∗ = η(1− e
w∗
R̄
)−BL∗m
That means (z∗, w∗, L∗m, L
∗
x) is feasible.
One can easily check that
´∞
0
N (z, w, Lm, Ln)e−ρtdt is continuous with re-
spect to (z, w, Lm, Lx) for the strong topology L1(e−ρtdt). Since this func-
tion is concave, it is upper semi-continuous for σ(L1(e−ρtdt), L∞). Thus, ν ≤´∞
0
N (z∗, w∗, L∗m, L∗n)e−ρtdt. This actually proves ν =
´∞
0
N (z∗, w∗, L∗m, L∗n)e−ρtdt
and (z∗, w∗, L∗m, L
∗
n) is the optimal solution.
Proof of Proposition 5
In the optimal steady state, we have At = A0etgA where A0 is the initial level
of technology and gA is the constant rate of growth of technology. Given that
the rate of growth of resources gR = η
(
1− R̂t
R
)
− BL̂m is constant on the
steady state then R̂ = R̄
(
1− BL̂mη
)
is also constant. Note that the condition
0 ≤ L̂m ≤ ηB must hold for R ≥ 0.
The utility in the steady state is:
U = (1− α)
ˆ ∞
0
[log(A0) + tgA]e−ρtdt+ αβ
ˆ ∞
0
log(B)e−ρtdt
+ αβ
ˆ ∞
0
log(L̂m)e−ρtdt+ αβ
ˆ ∞
0
log(R̂)e−ρtdt
+ α(1− β)
ˆ ∞
0
log(L̂x)e−ρtdt
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Using
´∞
0
te−ρtdt = 1ρ2 ,
´∞
0
e−ρtdt = 1ρ and noting gA = λ(µ − 1)L̂r = λ(µ −
1)(1− L̂x − L̂m) the above utility function becomes:
ρU = (1− α) log(A0) + αβ log(B) + αβ log(L̂m)
+ αβ log(R̄) + αβ log(1− BL̂m
η
) + α(1− β) log(L̂x)
+
(1− α)λ(µ− 1)(1− L̂x − L̂m)
ρ
We now maximize U with respect to L̂x and L̂m. The first order conditions
with respect to these choice variables give:
B
η −BL̂m
=
1
L̂m
− (1− α)λ(µ− 1)
αβρ
(59)
and
L̂x =
αρ(1− β)
(1− α)λ(µ− 1) =
ρ
ϕ
(60)
The left hand side (LHS) of equation (59) is increasing in L̂m, equal Bη when
L̂m = 0 and approaching +∞ when L̂m → ηB . The right hand side (RHS)
is, in contrast, decreasing in L̂m, approaching +∞ when L̂m → 0 and equal
B
η −
(1−α)λ(µ−1)
αβρ when L̂m =
η
B . Hence, this equation has a unique solution
L̂m ∈ (0, ηB ).
Actually, equation (59) can be solved explicitly to get the expression of L̂m.
Indeed, rearranging (59) gives a quadratic equation of L̂m:
Bλ(µ− 1)(1− α)L̂2m − [2Bαβρ+ λ(µ− 1)(1− α)η] L̂m + αβρη = 0
Noting that ϕ = (1−α)λ(µ−1)α(1−β) , this equation can be rewritten as:
B(1− β)ϕL̂2m − [2Bβρ+ (1− β)ϕη] L̂m + βρη = 0
This equation has two distinct real roots but one of them has to be ruled out
due to violating L̂m < ηB .
7 The accepted root is L̂m =
2Bβρ+(1−β)ϕη−√4
2B(1−β)ϕ where
4 = 4B2α2β2ρ2 + (1− β)2ϕ2η2.
Having obtained L̂x and L̂m, we can calculate L̂r = 1 − L̂x − L̂m = 1 −
2Bρ+(1−β)ϕη−√4
2B(1−β)ϕ . Since L̂x ≥ 0, L̂m ≥ 0, the condition L̂r ≥ 0 or
2Bρ+(1−β)ϕη−√4
2B(1−β)ϕ ≤
1 is sufficient for Lx, Lm, Lr ≤ 1. Using these results, the growth rates of tech-
nology, natural resources, output, and consumption are calculated as follows:
gA = λ(µ− 1)L̂r
7The ruled out root is Lm =
2Bαβρ+λ(µ−1)(1−α)η+√4
2Bλ(µ−1)(1−α) .
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gR = 0
gY = gC = (1− α)gA = (1− α)λ(µ− 1)L̂r
Proof of Proposition 6
We consider dynamic equations (16) and (18). We can write them as follows
Ṙ
Rt
= G(Lmt, Rt)
L̇mt
Lmt
= H(Lmt, Rt)
where
G(Lmt, Rt) = η(1− RtR̄ )−BLmt
H(Lmt, Rt) =
ϕα(1−β)+Bαβ
αβ Lmt +
α(1−β)η
αβLxtR̄
LmtRt − ρ− ηRtR̄
The steady state (L̂m, R̂) is solutions to the system:
G(Lmt, Rt) = 0, H(Lmt, Rt) = 0
However, we can introduce the variables wt = log(Rt), vt = log(Lmt). To
simplify notations, we drop the time subscript t unless there is a confusion. The
dynamic system becomes:
ẇ = η(1− ew
R̄
)−Bev
v̇ =
[
ϕ(1−β)+Bβ
β
]
ev + (1−β)η
βLxR̄
evew − ρ− η
R̄
ew
The steady state satisfies:
η(1− ew
R̄
)−Bev = 0
[
ϕ(1−β)+Bβ
β
]
ev + (1−β)η
βLxR̄
evew − ρ− η
R̄
ew = 0
The Jacobian matrix of the system is:
J =
[
−ηew
R̄
−Bev
(1−β)η
βLxR̄
evew − ηew
R̄
[
ϕ(1−β)+Bβ
β
]
ev + (1−β)η
βLxR̄
evew
]
Let λ1 and λ2 be eigen values of vector J then they will be solutions to the
following equation:
λ2 − tr(J)λ+ det(J) = 0
It can be seen that λ1 and λ2 will satisfy:
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λ1 + λ2 = −tr(J)
λ1λ2 = det(J)
Evaluating at the steady state value, we obtain:
tr(J) = ρ
det(J) = ηe
w
R̄
[
Bev
(
(1−β)L∗m
βL∗x
− 1
)
− ρ− ηew
R̄
]
Because
(
(1−β)L∗m
βL∗x
− 1
)
< 0 according to Lemma 5, det(J) < 0. This means
that λ1 and λ2 take real value with λ1 > 0 and λ2 < 0. The steady state is a
saddle point. Since the problem is not concave, we will prove that the stable
manifold is actually optimal.
Now take a feasible path on the stable manifold and close to the steady state.
Denoting it by (z∗, w∗), we have:
L∗mt =
1
e
´ t
0 b(u)du
(
c1 −
´ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx
)
in which c1 ≥
´∞
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx and
h(x) =
(1− α)λ(µ− 1)
βα
+B +
η(1− β)
βL∗xt
× R
∗
x
R̄
=
(1− α)λ(µ− 1)
βα
+B +
η(1− β)ϕ
βρ
× R
∗
x
R̄
We claim that c1 =
´∞
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx. Indeed, we have
ˆ ∞
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx = B
ˆ ∞
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
Assume c1 = a+B
´∞
0
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+ ϕ(1−β)ρβ with a > 0 then
e
´ t
0 b(u)du
(
c1 −
ˆ t
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx
)
= ae
´ t
0 b(u)du +Be
´ t
0 b(u)du
ˆ ∞
t
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+
ϕ(1− β)
ρβ
≥ ae
´ t
0 b(u)dudx→ +∞ when t→ +∞
Therefore L∗mt → 0 when t → +∞. Because we are on the stable manifold at
which L∗mt converges to a strictly positive value, we have a contradiction. Thus
c1 =
´∞
0
h(x)e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx and
L∗mt =
1
Be
´ t
0 b(u)du
´∞
t
e−
´ x
0 b(u)dudx+ ϕ(1−β)ρβ
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We compute again
4T =
ˆ T
0
[M(z∗, ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)−M(z, ż, w, ẇ)] e−ρtdt
where (z, w) is a feasible path. The technique in the proof of Proposition 2 can
be used again to obtain:
4T ≥ IT + JT
where
IT = −
α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
[
1
G(ż∗, w∗, ẇ∗)
(z∗t − zt)e−ρt
]T
0
= −α(1− β)
λ(µ− 1)
z∗T − zT
L∗xt
e−ρT
and
JT =
[
α(1− β)
BL∗x
− αβ
BL∗m
]
(w∗T − wT )e−ρT
We still have:
z∗0 = z0 = log(A0)
L∗x0 =
ρ
ϕ
and
limt→∞ IT = 0
We also have:
logR0 − bT ≤ logR∗T = w∗T ≤ log R̄
logR0 − bT ≤ logRT = wT ≤ log R̄
which implies
(logR0 − bT )e−ρT ≤ w∗T e−ρT ≤ log R̄e−ρT
(logR0 − bT )e−ρT ≤ wT e−ρT ≤ log R̄e−ρT
Because L∗mt converges to a steady state which is strictly positive, we get:
lim
T→+∞
JT = 0
This means that the optimal path locally converges to the steady state.
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider an equilibrium of the decentralized economy. Since p∗mt =
α2βY ∗t
M∗t
and
L∗xt =
α2(1−β)Y ∗t
w∗t
, on the one hand, we have:
w∗t
p∗mt
=
1− β
β
× M
∗
t
L∗xt
=
1− β
β
× BL
∗
mtR
∗
t
L∗xt
and on the other hand from Lemma 7, we have:
w∗t
p∗mt
= BR∗t
These imply:
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L∗mt =
β
1−βL
∗
xt
Now we check if this equilibrium satisfies the social planner’s maximization
problem or not. In doing so, assume that this equilibrium solves the social
planner’s maximization problem. In that case, we should have L∗xt =
ρ
ϕ and
L∗mt =
β
1−βL
∗
xt =
β
1−β
ρ
ϕ .
Using relation (18) in Lemma 2, we get:
ραβ +
αβηR∗t
R̄
− [ϕα(1− β) +Bαβ] β
1− β
ρ
ϕ
=
α(1− β)η
L∗xtR̄
L∗mtR
∗
t
or
ραβ +
αβηR∗t
R̄
− [ϕα(1− β) +Bαβ] β
1− β
ρ
ϕ
= α(1− β)η β
1− β
R∗t
R̄t
This implies Bαβ
2ρ
(1−β)ϕ = 0 which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 9
We first consider the case of non-renewable resources where η = 0. Denote
L∗x, L
∗
m, L
∗
r as allocations of labour across sectors at decentralized equilibrium
steady state. Because these labour allocations are constant in steady state, we
drop the time subscript for simplicity.
From (34) we have:
Rt = R0e−BL
∗
mt (61)
and
At = A0eλ(µ−1)L
∗
rt (62)
By successive substitution, we have:
L∗x =
α2(1− β)Atxα−1t
wt
from(31)and(28)
=
α2(1− β)At
wt
[
Mβt L
∗1−β
x
At
]α−1
from(29)
=
α2(1− β)A2−αt
wt
M
β(α−1)
t L
∗(α−1)(1−β)
=
α2(1− β)A2−αt
pmtBRt
M
β(α−1)
t L
∗(α−1)(1−β)
x from(33)
=
α2(1− β)A2−αt Mβα−βt L∗(α−1)(1−β)x
α2βA∗1−αt M
∗αβ−1
t L
∗α(1−β)
x BRt
from(32)
=
(1− β)AtM1−βt L∗−(1−β)x
βBRt
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Hence
L∗2−βx =
(1− β)AtB1−βR1−βt L∗1−βm
βBRt
from(30)
=
1
β
(1− β)AtB−βR−βt L∗1−βm
Now using (61) and (62) then this becomes:
L∗2−βx =
1
β
(1− β)A0eλ(µ−1)L
∗
rtB−βR−β0 e
−βBL∗mtL∗1−βm (63)
Since L∗x is constant, we must have:
λ(µ− 1)L∗r = βBL∗m (64)
Relation (63) becomes:
L∗2−βx =
1
β
(1− β)A0B−βR−β0 L∗1−βm (65)
Combining (64), (65) and (36) we get an equation for L∗r :
λ(µ− 1)
βB
L∗r +
[
1
β
(1− β)A0B−βR−β0
] 1
2−β
[
λ(µ− 1)
βB
] 1−β
2−β
L
∗ 1−β2−β
r +L∗r = 1 (66)
The LHS is strictly increasing in L∗r , equals to 0 if L
∗
r = 0, and greater than 1
if L∗r = 1. Hence, there exists a unique solution L
∗
r ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 1 gives the values of labors on the steady state of the optimal
path. In particular, we have:
L̂r = 1−
(
ρ
ϕ
+
βρ
ϕ(1− β) +Bβ
)
Let ρ̃ satisfy 0 = 1 −
(
ρ̃
ϕ +
βρ̃
ϕ(1−β)+Bβ
)
or ρ̃ = ϕ[ϕ(1−β)+Bβ]ϕ+Bβ . Then 1 −(
ρ
ϕ +
βρ
ϕ(1−β)+Bβ
)
> 0⇔ ρ < ρ̃. If ρ is close to 0 then L̂r is close to 1 and tends
to be larger than L∗r . In this case, an under-investment in R&D will happen in
the decentralized economy in the long-run and technology will grow below the
socially desirable rate. By contrast, if ρ is close to ρ̃ then L̂r is close to 0 and
tends to be smaller than L∗r . This implies an over-investment in R&D of the
decentralized economy in the long-run and technology grows faster than what
the society desires to have.
For the case of renewable resources, everything stays the same except now
η > 0 and
.
Rt = ηRt
(
1− Rt
R
)
− BLmtRt. In steady state, given that L∗m
is constant and the growth rate of R∗t is also constant, we can deduce that
R∗ =
(
1− BL
∗
m
η
)
R̄. Using (30), we get:
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L∗2−βx =
1
β (1− β)AtB−βR∗−βL∗1−βm
Note that this implies At constant in steady state or L∗r = 0.
Recall that under the socially optimal steady state (presented in Proposition
5), we have:
L̂r = 1− ρϕ −
2Bβρ+(1−β)ϕη−√4
2B(1−β)ϕ > 0
This means that the decentralized steady state entails an under-investment in
R&D in the long-run in the case of renewable resources.
Proof of Proposition 10
(i) When resources are renewable:
When λ (or µ) increases, the RHS of (59) decreases while its LHS does not
change. The graph of the RHS shifts down implying that L̂m decreases. It is
obvious that in this case L̂x decreases. Hence, L̂r increases since L̂r = 1− L̂x−
L̂m. As a result, gY increases.
When ρ increases, L̂x increases as per (60). The graph of the RHS of (59)
shifts up while the LHS does not change implying an increase in L̂m. Therefore,
L̂r decreases and, thus, gY decreases as well.
As for the welfare effects, we have:
∂U
∂λ
=
1
ρ
.
∂L̂m
∂λ
[
αβ
L̂m
− Bαβ
η −BL̂m
− (1− α)λ(µ− 1)
ρ
]
+
1
ρ
.
∂L̂x
∂λ
[
α(1− β)
L̂x
− (1− α)λ(µ− 1)
ρ
]
+
(1− α)(µ− 1)(1− L̂x − L̂m)
ρ2
Observe that the first two terms are equal to zero along the optimal steady
state as per (59) and (60). Hence, ∂U∂λ =
(1−α)(µ−1)(1−L̂x−L̂m)
ρ2 > 0. Similarly,
we have ∂U∂µ =
(1−α)λ(1−L̂x−L̂m)
ρ2 > 0 and
∂U
∂ρ = − 1ρU−
(1−α)(µ−1)(1−L̂x−L̂m)
ρ3 < 0.
(ii) When resources are non-renewable:
It is obvious from (37) and (38) that when λ (or µ) increases, L̂x and L̂m both
decrease meaning L̂r increases and gY increases (because gY = (1 − α)λ(µ −
1)L̂r − αβBL̂m). By contrast, when ρ increases, L̂x and L̂m both increase
implying L̂r decreases and gY decreases.
Regarding the welfare effect, we have:
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∂U
∂λ
=
1
ρ
.
∂L̂m
∂λ
[
αβ
L̂m
− Bαβ
ρ
− (1− α)λ(µ− 1)
ρ
]
+
1
ρ
.
∂L̂x
∂λ
[
α(1− β)
L̂x
− (1− α)λ(µ− 1)
ρ
]
+
(1− α)(µ− 1)(1− L̂x − L̂m)
ρ2
With a note that the first two terms are zero according to (37) and (38) then
∂U
∂λ =
(1−α)(µ−1)(1−L̂x−L̂m)
ρ2 > 0. A similar result applies for µ as
∂U
∂µ =
(1−α)λ(1−L̂x−L̂m)
ρ2 > 0. However,
∂U
∂ρ = − 1ρU −
αβBL̂m
ρ3 −
(1−α)(µ−1)(1−L̂x−L̂m)
ρ3 <
0.
Proof of Proposition 11
(i) When resources are renewable:
From (59) and (60), it can be seen that an increase in B does not affect L̂x.
However, it reduces L̂m as the graph of the LHS of (59), which is increasing in
L̂m, shifts up while the RHS of that equation, which is decreasing in L̂m, stays
the same. Hence, L̂r rises and so does gY .
With respect to welfare, using (59), we have ∂U∂B =
αβL̂m
ρB
[
1
L̂m
− B
η−BL̂m
]
=
(1−α)λ(µ−1)L̂m
ρ2B > 0 meaning welfare rises with B.
(ii) When resources are non-renewable:
Plugging the values of L̂m and L̂r from (38) and (39) into the equation for the
growth rate of output along the BGP we obtain:
gY = λ(µ− 1)(1− α)− αρ
It can be seen that B does not appear in the result for gY . Hence, an increase
in B does not have any impact on long-run output growth.
As for the welfare, we have ∂U∂B =
αβ
ρ
[
1
B − L̂mρ
]
. From (38), it can be figured
out that L̂m < ρB . Therefore,
∂U
∂B > 0 or U is increasing in B.
Proof of Proposition 12
Under renewable resources, output growth is:
gY = α(1− β)ϕ− αρ+ α
√4−α(1−β)ϕη
2B
where 4 = 4B2α2β2ρ2 + (1− β)2ϕ2η2. Under non-renewable resources, output
growth is:
gY = α(1− β)ϕ− αρ
39
Clearly,
√4 − (1 − β)ϕη ≥ 0 implying a generally higher output growth for
renewable resource case. The two rates are equal only when
√4−(1−β)ϕη = 0
or β = 0 meaning there is absolutely no utilization of natural resources in
intermediate good production.
Obviously, along the optimal steady state for renewable resources, output
growth is non-negative. Along the optimal steady state for non-renewable re-
sources, output growth may be negative if:
(1− β)ϕ = (1−α)λ(µ−1)α < ρ
However, this condition violates what stated in Lemma 5 so negative growth
will not occur. Hence, we always have λ(µ− 1) > αρ1−α implying that as soon as
the R&D sector is sufficiently productive, positive growth will be sustained no
matter what type of resources is employed for production.
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